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GOING TO COURT, INTERNATIONALLY 
Detlev F. Vagts* 
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS. Edited 
by Lori Fisler Damrosch. Dobbs Ferry: Transnational Publishers. 
1987. Pp. xxviii, 511. $67.50. 
Writing a review of a book on international law for an audience of 
non-international lawyers makes one aware of the great differences in 
the assumptions governing international as distinct from domestic law. 
The domestic litigator would hardly expect to consider such issues as: 
(1) Should we submit to the jurisdiction of the court, and if so, to what 
extent? (2) If a court finds that it has jurisdiction, should we be so 
gracious as to participate in its proceedings? (3) If it determines the 
issues against us, should we obey or disregard the decree that results? 
Yet, these are the issues which the book under review must address as 
it considers the litigation between the United States and Nicaragua in 
the International Court of Justice. The International Court of Justice 
at a Crossroads collects and analyzes the materials necessary for mak-
ing a decision about the future relationship of the United States to the 
Court in the aftermath of the Nicaragua litigation. It makes no collec-
tive recommendations and each of the various contributors under-
standably has different inclinations. Indeed, so neutral is this work 
that it slides smoothly over the fact that its sponsor, the American 
Society of International Law, voted to deplore the first step the United 
States took to restrict its consent to the Court's jurisdiction.1 But the 
volume provides much useful information for deciding whether the 
United States should again make a general consent to be sued in The 
Hague. 2 Such a step would require the consent of the Senate, so the 
matter will be debated in circles far wider than the restricted world of 
international lawyers. 
To begin such an inquiry, one needs to review the bases for the 
International Court's jurisdiction, the United States' initial acceptance 
of the Court's optional jurisdiction, and the steps that led the United 
* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. A.B. 1948, LL.B. 1951, Harvard University. 
I. The book correctly notes, however, that "[a]s a general rule the Society does not take 
positions on matters of public policy." P. xx. For the text of the Society's resolution, see Gill, 
The United States and the Rule of Law, INTL. PRAC. NOTEBOOK No. 31, 17, 19 (July 1985). 
2. There are other studies of the relationship between the United States and the Court, but 
they lack the detail and thoroughness of this volume. See, e.g., THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
CoMPUISORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CoURT OF JUSTICE (A. Arend ed. 1986); 
T. FRANCK, JUDGING THE WORLD CoURT (1986); Appraisals of the ICJ's Decision: Nicaragua v. 
United States (Merits), 81 AM. J. INTL. L. 77 (1987). 
1712 
May 1989) Going to Court, Internationally 1713 
States to revoke that acceptance. The Court's jurisdiction over dis-
putes between states is limited to three categories: (1) cases that have 
already matured into disputes and are submitted to the Court by the 
disputants, (2) cases arising under prior treaties between the parties 
which contain clauses submitting future disputes to the Court, and (3) 
cases arising between two or more parties that have accepted the so-
called "optional clause," which submits cases arising under interna-
tional law to the jurisdiction of the Court. We are here primarily con-
cerned with the third type of jurisdiction, which is sometimes 
confusingly referred to as the "compulsory jurisdiction" of the Court, 
although it arises under the "optional clause." In 1946, at the time of 
the creation of the United Nations, the United States chose to file a 
submission to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, although it 
appended the so-called Connally Reservation, which excluded all cases 
that the United States should determine to be essentially within its 
domestic jurisdiction.3 On April 6, 1984, the United States tried to 
modify this acceptance by excluding "disputes with any Central 
American State or arising out of or related to events in Central 
America."4 On April 9, 1984, Nicaragua initiated proceedings against 
the United States before the Court. On November 26, 1984, the 
Court, over the objections of the United States, ruled that it had juris-
diction. 5 On January 18, 1985, the United States gave the six-months' 
notice to terminate its acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction that was 
specified in its original submission of 1946. On June 27, 1986, the 
Court announced its judgment that the United States had violated in-
ternational law in its actions toward Nicaragua. 6 
Where does the United States go from here? The basic preliminary 
question is whether the International Court is, by virtue of its compo-
sition and organization, a satisfactory place in which to settle at least 
some of the international disputes in which the United States finds 
itself involved. In matters arising under domestic law, a lawyer has 
control over such questions only to the extent that she might challenge 
a certain judge for cause or, in some cases, might manipulate the court 
calendars or venue provisions so as to avoid a particular judge or 
court. At the international level, the United States has much more 
control. Thus, we may ask ourselves whether the court's behavior in 
the Nicaragua case suggests that it might not treat the United States 
3. Pp. 14-17. The 1946 Declaration, 61 Stat. 1218 (1947), is reprinted as Annex Cat pp. 469-
70. 
4. See Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 398 (Jurisdictional Order of Nov. 26); DEPT. ST. BULL. (no. 2087), June 
1984 at 89 (summary of letter). 
5. Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
1984 I.C.J. 392 (Jurisdictional Order of Nov. 26). 
6. Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
1986 I.C.J. 14 (Judgment on Merits of June 26). 
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even-handedly in future cases. After nearly thirty years of treating 
jurisdictional questions in a most cautious and conservative way, 7 the 
Court stretched to bring this case within its jurisdictional scope. For 
one thing, the Court overrode the fact that Nicaragua had never actu-
ally filed consent to the Court's jurisdiction. The Court found instead 
that, by ratifying the Statute of the new International Court of Justice, 
Nicaragua had in effect ratified its unfiled consent to be sued before the 
old Permanent Court of International Justice. Arguably, the filing re-
quirement should have been strictly enforced, thus disabling Nicara-
gua from suing 'the United States in the International Court (since, 
under the Court's Statute, a state is deemed to have consented to juris-
diction only vis-a-vis .other states which have undertaken reciprocal 
obligations).8 The Court's finding that Nicaragua had effectively con-
sented seemed unwarranted to quite a few Americans, including some, 
such as Leo Gross, who are generally sympathetic to wider use of the 
Court9 and are not committed to United States policy in Central 
America. 
Other qecisions en route to the ruling on the merits have seemed 
strained to American viewers. For example, the denial without a hear-
ing of El Salvador's application to intervene aroused not only Ameri-
can opposition but dissent among members of the Court itself.10 
Moreover, the title given to the case, "Military and Paramilitary Ac-
tivities in and against Nicaragua" assumes the very facts which were 
to be determined. 11 And in an extraordinary press interview, the Pres-
ident of the Court attacked the United States for its activities in Gre-
7. See.. e.g., Nottebohm Case (Liecht. v. Guat.), 1953 I.C.J. 111 (inventing requirement of 
"genuine link" between state party and injured national); Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. 
(Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (barring state of corporation's shareholders from protecting it). 
Prof. Gross thus refers to the Nicaragua case "as an aberration." P. 48. 
8. 2. The States parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recog-
nize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other State 
accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning: 
(a) the interpretation of a treaty; 
(b) any question of international law; 
(c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an inter-
national obligation; 
(d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international 
obligation. 
STAT. OF THE l.C.J. art. 36, para. 2. 
9. See Gross, Underutilization of the International Court of Justice, 27 HARV. INTL. L.J. 571 
(1986). Five of the judges of the Court dissented on the jurisdictional point and one other admit-
ted doubts. Foreign scholars have also expressed skepticism of the Court's opinion. Oellers-
Frahm, Die "Obligatorische" Gerichtsbarkeit des Internationalen Gerichtshoft, 18 Z.A.o. R. V. 
243, 247 (1987); Eisemann, L'a"et de la CLJ. du 26 Novembre 1984 (Competence et 
Recevabilite) dans L 'Ajfaire des Activites Militaires et Paramilitaires au Nicaragua et Cantre 
Celui-ci, 1984 ANNuAIRE FRANgAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 372. 
10. See 1986 I.C.J. Adv. Rel. 1-3 (Schwebel, J., dissenting) (copy on file with the Michigan 
Law Library). The denial of a hearing was sustained by a vote of 9-6. 1984 I.C.J. 215, 216. 
11. 1986 l.C.J. Adv. Rel., at 7 (Schwebel, J., dissenting). 
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nada while the Nicaragua matter was pending. 12 All in all, the 
negative reaction by the United States officials who were involved with 
the litigation is understandable. Only one article in the book under 
review assembles those objections, though in a rather conclusory fash-
ion, and examines them as they relate to U.S. consent in the future (p. 
421). 
An interesting contribution by Professor Edith Brown Weiss .offers 
another way to assess the objectivity of the Court. She analyzes the 
voting patterns of the judges of the Court by grouping their votes in 
tables that will seem familiar to readers of commentary on the United 
States Supreme Court. Weiss comes to the conclusion ~hat "there 
have not been persistent voting alignments which have significantly 
affected the decisions of the Court" (p. 134). She compares the 
Court's votes with the "persistent alignments that we find in the voting 
behavior of the [United Nations General Assembly], and to a lesser 
extent in that of the U.S. Supreme Court" (p. 133). Yet amateur stat-
isticians may wonder whether the population of cases Weiss uses suf-
fices to bear the weight of her analysis. · The thirty-four contentious 
cases she uses, involving nearly twice as many separate rulings (pp. 
135-38), represent the life's work of the Court in its forty years in 
existence. By contrast, an analysis of alignments on the U.S. Supreme 
Court will process some 150 cases for a single term. 13 Thus, Weiss' 
analysis does not provide a reliable basis for arguing against American 
decisionmakers' reactions to the Nicaragua case itself. 
Understandably, the United States is weighing its options with 
caution. One of those options is to do nothing about its cancellation of 
submission under the optional clause, which would leave the United 
States subject to the Court's jurisdiction only in cases arising under 
clauses in various treaties which commit disputes over their applica-
tion to resolution by the I.C.J. 14 Submission to International Court 
jurisdiction even to this limited extent has been questioned since Nica-
ragua. There are now at least seventy treaties which so bind the 
United States (p. 62). These include both bilateral treaties with some 
thirty countries and multilateral conventions which commit us with 
respect to virtually every country in the world. However, these obliga-
tions can and do work for our benefit. We were able, for example, to 
bring the plight of American hostages in Tehran to the Court under 
12. Id. at 314-15. 
13. See, e.g., p. 132, n.49 (citing The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, 99 HARV. L. REv. 120 
(1984)). A pedantic note - the cited volume of Harvard Law Review actually is dated 1985 and 
contains the Supreme Court note for the 1984 term, not the 1983 term. However, the statement 
that Burger, Rehnquist, and O'Connor voted together in over 88% of the votes is true for both 
the 1983 and the 1984 terms. See The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, 98 HARV. L. REV. l, 308 
(1984). This slip of a digit aside, the book is obviously carefully edited and pains have been taken 
to pull together the products of many different contributors. 
14. The contribution by Prof. Morrison (pp. 58-81) describes these treaties and lists them in a 
series of useful appendices at pp. 78-81. 
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such a provision.15 The interpretation of the bilateral and multilateral 
treaties involved in the Nicaragua case, which seems somewhat 
strained to American observers, should not discourage us from contin-
uing with this course. Such jurisdiction should be kept intact, and 
indeed extended through new treaties. 
Another possibility for the United States would be to return to a 
submission under the optional clause, since the United States can con-
fine and structure its submission as it chooses. The problem is one of 
finding words that will provide a meaningful consent to jurisdiction 
without opening possibilities for overgenerous construction by the 
Court in the future. As Professor Gordon notes, there is no preexist-
ing rule that inhibits the Court from taking up political or other sensi-
tive disputes - such limits cannot be inferred from the fact that the 
Court under its Statute can only handle "legal" disputes (pp. 183-84). 
Similarly, Professor Schachter finds no rule that keeps the Court from 
deciding cases involving the use of force (p. 223). Thus any new reser-
vation by the United States must expressly provide for such limits if 
we want them. The words must be so chosen that they will bar the 
Court from ruling at a preliminary stage that it has the right to pro-
ceed. A reservation as to acts of self-defense would be insufficient, 
since an intense exploration of the facts would be required to deter-
mine whether an action was aggressive or in self-defense. On the other 
hand, perhaps a reservation that would exclude any controversy hav-
ing to do with a reasonably perceived threat to national security would 
stop offensive litigation in limine. The best professional crafting 
should be applied to this task before the Senate is asked to give its 
consent to a new submission.16 We will certainly have to do better this 
time than we did with the Connally Reservation in 1946, which for 
years impeded our own resort to the Court and then failed us in the 
Nicaragua case because nobody was willing to claim that the case fell 
within the "domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America as 
determined by [the United States]." 
An alternative to renewing assent to the ICJ's jurisdiction is to 
submit our disputes to other institutions. The United States has taken 
cases to panels composed of a few members of the Court, once before 
the Nicaraguan case with Canada and once afterwards with Italy. 17 
15. Relating to the U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 
3. 
16. For an example of a "national security" reservation, see the form used by France from 
1966 until 1974. 1965-1966 I.C.J.Y.B. 49 (1966). A number of articles suggesting submission to 
the optional clause with new reservations are listed at p. 179 n.68. 
17. The Canadian controversy resulted in Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Bound-
ary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246; the Italian matter thus far has 
resulted in two preliminary orders, Concerning Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (U.S. v. Italy), 1987 
I.C.J. 3, and 1987 I.C.J. 185. Messrs. Leigh and Ramsey propose "that the U.S. adhere to the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court subject to the condition that the Court's compulsory juris· 
diction would be exercised only by an ad hoc chamber - composed. of members acceptable to the 
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The United States recently has responded to an unexpected challenge 
by the Soviet Union by offering to submit disputes between the two 
powers to a panel.18 If the underlying problem with the ICJ from an 
American perspective is that the attitudes of the Third World play too 
large a role in the Court's thinking, the cure is to submit controversies 
to a panel representing First World thought. On the other hand, this 
idea dispenses with something significant: the concept of a true world 
court generating law for the whole community of nations. 19 ' 
The current position of the United States is thus troubling. In a 
variety of unilateral maneuvers, such as the withdrawal from 
UNESCO, the operations in Grenada, the closure of the PLO liaison 
office at the United Nations, and the failure to pay full UN dues, the 
United States has largely isolated itself from world public and legal 
opinion. There were some signs by the fall of 1988 that deci-
sionmakers wanted to move back into the mainstream, most clearly in 
the resumption of payments on United Nations dues.20 By the time 
this appears in print, we may know more about how far our govern-
ment will be willing to go along that road. The costs of continuing on 
a separatist course are various, ranging from its direct effect on foreign 
opinion, to its effect on the overall systemic consideration of the value 
of strengthening the rule of law internationally by allowing for judicial 
resolution of disputes. 
United States •... " P. 122. They concede that this proposal is subject to unilateral frustration 
by the United States as to the acceptability of judges and is thus somewhat like the Connally 
Reservation. However, they seek to minimize the significance of that precedent and do so fairly 
convincingly, though their statement that "the United States has never invoked the self-judging 
provision of the Connally Reservation" (p. 119) needs qualification in the light of our action in 
the lnterhandel Case (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 l.C.J. 6, 11. 
18. DEPT. ST. BULL. (no. 2140), Nov. 1988, at 5. 
19. Leigh and Ramsey reply that "some type of compulsory jurisdiction is better than no 
compulsory jurisdiction at all." P. 118. 
20. Williamson, Developments in the UN System, DEPT. ST. BULL. (no. 2138), Sept. 1988, 
at 62, 64. 
